[cod] A word of advice

Geoff Goas gitman at gmail.com
Wed Jan 20 13:33:59 EST 2010


what's worse is that you can't change the name of your console log. its
always console_server_mp.log, and it always contains a cvar dump, which
always contains the rcon password.

On Wed, Jan 20, 2010 at 12:00 PM, Riku Kaura-aho <richarttos at gmail.com>wrote:

> Server cfgs can be renamed randomly so they are easy to protect assuming
> that you can't get file list. System files are whole different thing.
> Chrooting works but it ain't acceptable to have a bug like this coz it's
> kinda likely that if someone uses this hole it won't take long to figure out
> some weak points just by guessing.
>
> 2010/1/20 B.M. Schiltmans <b.m.schiltmans at planet.nl>
>
> Hmm, perhaps I should read first, and comment later. Sorry about that.
>> So the problem is not http-redirect but the direct download.
>> Am I correct in assuming that a modified client is needed for this 'hack'?
>> In that case, it should be easy to fake a failed http-redirect and force a
>> fallback to direct-download. Reading through it, it seems that the
>> server.cfg is not the only worry, if every file on your server can be read.
>> I see no workaround here, except maybe chroot. And even then your .cfg's
>> are at risk.
>> Only real solution would be a patch it seems.
>> Anyone got any info on which games are/are not vulnerable (not counting
>> the dinosaurs on securityfocus ;-) )?
>>
>>
>>
>> Geoff Goas wrote:
>>
>>> i know the difference here. the console log lines clearly stated
>>> (paraphrased) 'clientDownload <clientnum> : beginning "fs_game/server.cfg"'.
>>>
>>> only IWD's are contained in my HTTP redirect path.
>>>
>>> On Wed, Jan 20, 2010 at 3:32 AM, B.M. Schiltmans <
>>> b.m.schiltmans at planet.nl <mailto:b.m.schiltmans at planet.nl>> wrote:
>>>
>>>    I highly doubt that this is exploited trough the game. The way I
>>>    see it:
>>>    - You connect to some server with http-redirect enabled, and note
>>>    or memorize the http location that the downloads come from.
>>>    - Start a browser, and go to the http-redirect-site
>>>    - If you're 'lucky', you can see the cfg-files, either by browsing
>>>    the directories, or by guessing the .cfg name(s)
>>>
>>>    As an admin this can easily be prevented by any of the following:
>>>    - Don't store config-files on the http-redirect, in fact, just
>>>    store files there that actually need to be downloaded. Of course
>>>    this only works if you have an separate redirect-space.
>>>    - Instruct your webserver to not allow acces to thing like .cfg,
>>>    .txt, etc etc
>>>    - As an extra security/obscurity, just disable directory-browsing.
>>>    Let's not make anyone any smarter than they need to be ;-)
>>>
>>>    That should do the trick. Oh and one more thing (I learned the
>>>    hard way), NEVER EVER use the rcon password for something like an
>>>    os-user. IF someone finds out the password,.....
>>>
>>>    As a sidenote for clan-based servers. Clans often want to update
>>>    their usermaps all at once instead of on every map change. In this
>>>    case the http-redirect is not ideal, so we use rsync to do that.
>>>    When the server has updated maps, I send an email, and all they
>>>    have to do is click some desktop-icon to update their own set. We
>>>    implemented is because cod5 crashes a lot when it has to get an
>>>    updated version of some map.
>>>
>>>    Grtz
>>>    Bram
>>>
>>>
>>>    Tomé Duarte wrote:
>>>
>>>        I believe when you're using HTTP redirect the gameserver
>>>        automatically redirects all downloads to the configured URL.
>>>        However, a custom application to exploit this misconfiguration
>>>        may somehow be able to download the server.cfg; this depends
>>>        on the server code but it's highly probable that it redirects
>>>        the request to the webserver.
>>>
>>>        Does anyone have any more info on this vuln? Is it just the
>>>        sv_allowdownload cvar or are there any other "requirements"?
>>>        Is there a published vuln report or exploit?
>>>
>>>        Cheers,
>>>        Tomé Duarte
>>>
>>>        Connect with me via:
>>>        Twitter: http://twitter.com/tomeduarte
>>>        LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/in/tduarte
>>>
>>>
>>>        On Wed, Jan 20, 2010 at 1:04 AM, Geoff Goas <gitman at gmail.com
>>>        <mailto:gitman at gmail.com> <mailto:gitman at gmail.com
>>>
>>>        <mailto:gitman at gmail.com>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>           I do... I was under the impression that sv_allowdownload
>>>        had to be
>>>           enabled in order for HTTP redirect to work. Is that not the
>>>        case?
>>>
>>>
>>>           On Mon, Jan 18, 2010 at 7:36 PM, Mavrick Master
>>>           <mavrick.master at gmail.com <mailto:mavrick.master at gmail.com>
>>>        <mailto:mavrick.master at gmail.com
>>>        <mailto:mavrick.master at gmail.com>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>               Do you have the http redirect setup?
>>>
>>>               If not, may I suggest you set this up and in the off-server
>>>               http location only store the mod and not your config files.
>>>               This should solve your problem.
>>>
>>>
>>>               Daniel 'mavrick' Lang
>>>               www.mavrick.id.au <http://www.mavrick.id.au>
>>>        <http://www.mavrick.id.au>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>               On Sun, Jan 17, 2010 at 2:45 PM, Geoff Goas
>>>        <gitman at gmail.com <mailto:gitman at gmail.com>
>>>               <mailto:gitman at gmail.com <mailto:gitman at gmail.com>>>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>                   That's correct.
>>>
>>>
>>>                   On Mon, Jan 11, 2010 at 7:25 PM, Mavrick Master
>>>                   <mavrick.master at gmail.com
>>>        <mailto:mavrick.master at gmail.com>
>>>                   <mailto:mavrick.master at gmail.com
>>>        <mailto:mavrick.master at gmail.com>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>                       The client auto-download was used because I presume
>>>                       you are running a mod?
>>>
>>>                       Daniel 'mavrick' Lang
>>>                       www.mavrick.id.au <http://www.mavrick.id.au>
>>>        <http://www.mavrick.id.au>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>                       On Thu, Dec 31, 2009 at 11:15 PM, Hannu Kumpeli
>>>                       <hannu at shadowstyle.nl
>>>        <mailto:hannu at shadowstyle.nl> <mailto:hannu at shadowstyle.nl
>>>
>>>        <mailto:hannu at shadowstyle.nl>>>
>>>
>>>                       wrote:
>>>
>>>                           well after they got the rcon pass they could
>>>                           change all non write protected
>>>
>>>                           > But they could only download and view, not
>>>                           edit.correct?
>>>                           >
>>>                           >
>>>                           >
>>>                           > From: Geoff Goas [mailto:gitman at gmail.com
>>>        <mailto:gitman at gmail.com>
>>>                           <mailto:gitman at gmail.com
>>>        <mailto:gitman at gmail.com>>]
>>>                           > Sent: Thursday, December 31, 2009 1:03 AM
>>>                           > To: Call of Duty server admin list.
>>>                           > Subject: [cod] A word of advice
>>>                           >
>>>                           >
>>>                           >
>>>                           > This may not be news to some, but I just
>>>        first
>>>                           hand experience with it, so I
>>>                           > think I should share....
>>>                           >
>>>                           > Someone just gained access to the RCON
>>>        password
>>>                           for my CoD2 server.
>>>                           > Apparently, they were able to use the client
>>>                           auto-download functionality to
>>>                           > download my server configuration, which I
>>>                           (stupidly) had named "server.cfg".
>>>                           >
>>>                           > So a word to the wise - name your server
>>>        config
>>>                           in such a way that nobody
>>>                           > can guess what it is. This is a Q3 engine
>>>        bug,
>>>                           so the whole series is
>>>                           > affected.
>>>                           > --
>>>                           > Geoff Goas
>>>                           > Network Engineer
>>>                           >
>>>                           >
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>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>                   --            Geoff Goas
>>>                   Network Engineer
>>>
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>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>           --    Geoff Goas
>>>           Network Engineer
>>>
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>>>
>>>
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>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Geoff Goas
>>> Network Engineer
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
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>>>
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>


-- 
Geoff Goas
Network Engineer
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